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Abstract
Eliciting the preferences of a set of agents over a set of alternatives is a problem of funda-
mental importance in social choice theory. Prior work on this problem has studied the query
complexity of preference elicitation for the unrestricted domain and for the domain of single
peaked preferences. In this paper, we consider the domain of single crossing preference profiles
and study the query complexity of preference elicitation under various settings. We consider
two distinct situations: when an ordering of the voters with respect to which the profile is single
crossing is known versus when it is unknown. We also consider different access models: when the
votes can be accessed at random, as opposed to when they are coming in a pre-defined sequence.
In the sequential access model, we distinguish two cases when the ordering is known: the first
is that sequence in which the votes appear is also a single-crossing order, versus when it is not.
The main contribution of our work is to provide polynomial time algorithms with low query
complexity for preference elicitation in all the above six cases. Further, we show that the query
complexities of our algorithms are optimal up to constant factors for all but one of the above
six cases. We then present preference elicitation algorithms for profiles which are close to being
single crossing under various notions of closeness, for example, single crossing width, minimum
number of candidates|voters whose deletion makes a profile single crossing.
1 Introduction
Agents in multiagent systems often have individual preferences which are complete orders over a set
of candidates and one would like to find an aggregate ranking or choose the “best” candidate. Classic
examples where such a scenario appears are collaborative filtering [PHG00], rank aggregation over
web [DKNS01] etc. In a typical such setting, we have a set of agents or voters; each of them has
a preference, called a vote, over a set of candidates; and a voting rule (respectively an aggregation
function) which finds a candidate (respectively an aggregated preference) called winner.
However, eliciting the preferences of the agents is a nontrivial task since we often have a large
number of candidates (ranking restaurants for example) and it may often be infeasible for the
agents to rank all of them. Hence it becomes important to elicit the preferences of the agents by
asking them (hopefully a small number of) comparison queries only - ask an agent i to compare
two candidates x and y.
Unfortunately, it turns out that one would need ask every voter Ω(m logm) queries to know
her preference, and this argument is based on the decision-tree based lower bound on the number
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of comparisons for sorting an array. However, if the preferences are not completely arbitrary, but
admit additional structure, then possibly we can do better. Indeed, an affirmation of this thought
comes from the work of [Con09], who showed that we can elicit preferences using only O(m)
queries per voter for what are called single peaked preferences (which is a well-studied restriction
on preferences, and we will define the notion formally later in this section).
There are two reasons for restricting the domain of preferences. The first is that in several
application scenarios commonly considered, it is rare that votes are ad-hoc, demonstrating no
patterns whatsoever. For example, the notion of single-peaked preferences forms the basis of
several studies in the analytical political sciences [HM97].
The second motivation for studying restricted preferences comes from the fact that they are very
well-behaved from a theoretical perspective as well. The axiomatic approach of social choice involves
defining certain “properties” that formally capture the quality of a voting rule. For example, we
would not want a voting rule to be, informally speaking, a dictatorship, which would essentially
mean that it discards all but one voter’s input. As it happens, a series of cornerstone results
establish that it is impossible to devise voting rules which respect some of the simplest desirable
properties. Celebrated results in social choice theory [Arr50, Gib73, Sat75] show that it is impossible
to have an aggregation function or a voting rule that simultaneously satisfies a desirable set of
properties, for example, strategy-proofness, ontoness, non-dictatorship etc. We refer the reader
to [Mou91] for an excellent exposition of all key issues that arise in this context. Adding to
the difficulties is the fact that many important voting rules such as Kemeny [Kem59, Lev75],
Dodgson [Dod76, BNM+58], Young [You77], and Chamberlin-Courant [CC83] are computationally
intractable [BITT89, HSV05, PRZ08].
This brings us to the second important reason for considering structured preferences — they
provide a very elegant workaround to the difficulties that we outlined above. The domains of single
peaked and single crossing profiles are arguably the most important and well-studied domains
among such restricted domains [ST06, Wal07, ELO¨08, BH11, BM11, FHHR09, BCW13, CGS13,
SYFE13, MF14, Lac14, FHH14, EFLO15, EFS14, BBHH15]. A profile is called single peaked if
the candidates can be arranged in a complete order ≻ such that every preference ≻′ in the profile
respects the order ≻ in the sense that, for every two candidates x and y, we have x ≻′ y whenever
we have either c ≻ x ≻ y or y ≻ x ≻ c, where c is the most preferred candidate in ≻′ [Bla48]. On the
other hand a profile is called single crossing if the voters can be arranged in a complete order ≻
such that for every two candidates x and y, all the voters who prefer x over y appear consecutively
in ≻ [Mir71, Rob77].
1.1 Related Work
Conitzer and Sandholm show that determining whether we have enough information at any point
of the elicitation process for finding a winner under some common voting rules is computation-
ally intractable [CS02]. They also prove in their classic paper [CS05] that one would need to
make Ω(mn logm) queries even to decide the winner for many commonly used voting rules which
matches with the trivial O(mn logm) upper bound (based on sorting) for preference elicitation in
unrestricted domain. Dey and Misra proved tight query complexity bounds for preferences single
peaked on trees with respect to various tree parameters [DM16].
A natural question at this point is if these restricted domains allow for better elicitation algo-
rithms as well. The answer to this is in the affirmative, and one can indeed elicit the preferences
of the voters using only O(mn) many queries for the domain of single peaked preference profiles
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Ordering Access model
Query Complexity
Upper Bound Lower Bound
Known
Random O(m2 logn) Lemma 1 Ω(m logm +m logn) Theorem 1
Sequential single crossing order O(mn +m2) Theorem 2
Ω(m logm +mn) Theorem 3Sequential any order O(mn +m2 logn) Theorem 4
Unknown
Sequential any order O(mn +m3 logm) Theorem 5
Random O(mn +m3 logm) Corollary 1 Ω(m logm +mn) Theorem 6
Table 1: Summary of Results for preference elicitation for single crossing profiles.
[Con09]. Our work belongs to this kind of research– we investigate the number of queries one
has to ask for preference elicitation in single crossing domains. When some partial information
is available about the preferences, Ding and Lin prove interesting properties of what they call a
deciding set of queries [DL13]. Lu and Boutilier empirically show that several heuristics often work
well [LB11b, LB11a].
1.2 Contributions
In this paper we present novel algorithms for preference elicitation for the domain of single crossing
profiles in various settings. We consider two distinct situations: when an ordering of the voters with
respect to which the profile is single crossing is known versus when it is unknown. We also consider
different access models: when the votes can be accessed at random, as opposed to when they are
coming in a pre-defined sequence. In the sequential access model, we distinguish two cases when
the ordering is known: the first is that sequence in which the votes appear is also a single-crossing
order, versus when it is not. We also prove lower bounds on the query complexity of preference
elicitation for the domain of single crossing profiles; these bounds match the upper bounds up to
constant factors (for a large number of voters) for all the six scenarios above except the case when
we know a single crossing ordering of the voters and we have a random access to the voters; in this
case, the upper and lower bounds match up to a factor of O(m). We summarize our results in
Table 1.
2 Preliminaries
For a positive integer ℓ, we denote the set {1, . . . , ℓ} by [ℓ]. Let V = {vi ∶ i ∈ [n]} be a set of n
voters and C = {cj ∶ j ∈ [m]} be a set of m candidates. If not mentioned otherwise, we denote
the set of candidates, the set of voters, the number of candidates, and the voters by C , V , m,
and n respectively. Every voter vi has a preference ≻i which is a complete order over the set C of
candidates. We say voter vi prefers a candidate x ∈ C over another candidate y ∈ C if x ≻i y. We
denote the set of all preferences over C by L(C). The n-tuple (≻i)i∈[n] ∈ L(C)n of the preferences of
all the voters is called a profile. We say a candidate x is placed at the kth position of a preference
≻ if x is preferred over all but exactly (k − 1) other candidates in ≻ . Let Sn denote the set
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of all permutations over [n] and idn be the identity permutation of [n]. Let an ordering σ be
x1 ≻ x2 ≻ ⋯ ≻ xℓ. Then by
←Ðσ we denote the ordering xℓ ≻ ⋯ ≻ x2 ≻ x1. Given a subset X ⊆ C of
candidates and a preference ≻ over C , we denote the restriction of ≻ to X by ≻ (X). The restriction
of a profile P = (≻i)i∈[n] to X is denoted by P(X) = (≻i (X))i∈[n]. All the logarithms in this paper
are base 2 unless specified otherwise.
Single Crossing Domain A profile P = (≻1, . . . ,≻n) of n voters over a set C of candidates is
called a single crossing profile if there exists a permutation σ ∈ Sn of [n] such that, for every two
distinct candidates x, y ∈ C, whenever we have x ≻σ(i) y and x ≻σ(j) y for two integers i and j with
1 ⩽ i < j ⩽ n, we have x ≻σ(k) y for every i ⩽ k ⩽ j. The following observation is immediate from the
definition of single crossing profiles.
Observation 1 Suppose a profile P is single crossing with respect to an ordering σ ∈ Sn of votes.
Then P is single crossing with respect to the ordering ←Ðσ too.
Problem Formulation Suppose we have a profile P with n voters and m candidates. Let us
define a function Query(x ≻ℓ y) for a voter ℓ and two different candidates x and y to be true if
the voter ℓ prefers the candidate x over the candidate y and false otherwise. We now formally
define the problem.
Definition 1 Preference Elicitation
Given an oracle access to Query(⋅) for a single crossing profile P , find P .
For two distinct candidates x, y ∈ C and a voter ℓ , we say a Preference Elicitation algorithmA compares candidates x and y for voter ℓ , ifAmakes a call to eitherQuery(x ≻ℓ y) orQuery(y ≻ℓ
x). We define the number of queries made by the algorithm A , called the query complexity of A
, to be the number of distinct tuples (ℓ, x, y) ∈ V × C × C with x ≠ y such that the algorithm A
compares the candidates x and y for voter ℓ . Notice that, even if the algorithm A makes multiple
calls to Query(⋅) with same tuple (ℓ, x, y), we count it only once in the query complexity of A
. This is without loss of generality since we can always implement a wrapper around the oracle
which memorizes all the calls made to the oracle so far and whenever it receives a duplicate call,
it replies from its memory without “actually” making a call to the oracle. We say two query
complexities q(m,n) and q′(m,n) are tight up to a factor of ℓ for a large number of voters if
1/ℓ ⩽ limn→∞ q(m,n)/q′(m,n) ⩽ ℓ.
Note that by using a standard sorting routine like merge sort, we can fully elicit an unknown
preference using O(m logm) queries. We state this explicitly below, as it will be useful in our
subsequent discussions.
Observation 2 There is a Preference Elicitation algorithm for eliciting a single preference
with query complexity O(m logm).
Model of Input We study two models of input for Preference Elicitation for single crossing
profiles.
– Random access to voters: In this model, we have a set of voters and we are allowed to
ask any voter to compare any two candidates at any point of time. Moreover, we are also
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allowed to interleave the queries to different voters. Random access to voters is the model of
input for elections within an organization where every voter belongs to the organization and
can be queried any time.
– Sequential access to voters: In this model, voters are arriving in a sequential manner one
after another to the system. Once a voter ℓ arrives, we can query voter ℓ as many times as we
like and then we “release” the voter ℓ from the system to grab the next voter in the queue.
Once voter ℓ is released, it can never be queried again. Sequential access to voters is indeed
the model of input in many practical elections scenarios such as political elections, restaurant
ranking etc.
3 Results
In this section, we present our technical results. We first consider the (simpler) situation when
the single crossing order is known, and then turn to the case when the order is unknown. In both
cases, we explore all the relevant access models.
3.1 Results: Known Single Crossing Order
We begin with a simple Preference Elicitation algorithm when we are given a random access
to the voters and a single crossing ordering is known.
Lemma 1 Suppose a profile P is single crossing with respect to a known permutation of the vot-
ers. Given a random access to voters, there is a Preference Elicitation algorithm with query
complexity O(m2 logn).
Proof: By renaming, we assume that the profile is single crossing with respect to the identity
permutation of the votes. Now, for every (m
2
) pair of candidates {x, y} ⊂ C, we perform a binary
search over the votes to find the index i({x, y}) where the ordering of x and y changes. We now
know how any voter j orders any two candidates x and y from i({x, y}) and thus we have foundP. ◻
Interestingly, the simple algorithm in Lemma 1 turns out to be optimal up to a multiplicative
factor of O(m) as we prove next. The idea is to “pair up” the candidates and design an oracle
which “hides” the vote where the ordering of the two candidates in any pair (x, y) changes unless
it receives at least (logm − 1) queries involving only these two candidates x and y. We formalize
this idea below.
Theorem 1 Suppose a profile P is single crossing with respect to the identity permutation of votes.
Given random access to voters, any Preference Elicitation algorithm has query complexity
Ω(m logm +m logn).
Proof: The Ω(m logm) bound follows from the query complexity lower bound of sorting
and the fact that any profile consisting of only one preference ≻∈ L(C) is single crossing.
Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} be the set of m candidates where m is an even integer. Consider
the ordering Q = c1 ≻ c2 ≻ ⋯ ≻ cm ∈ L(C) and the following pairing of the candidates:{c1, c2},{c3, c4}, . . . ,{cm−1, cm}. Our oracle answers Query(⋅) as follows. The oracle fixes the
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preferences of the voters one and n to be Q and
←Ð
Q respectively. For every odd integer i ∈ [m], the
oracle maintains θi (respectively βi) which corresponds to the largest (respectively smallest) index
of the voter for whom (ci, ci+1) has already been queried and the oracle answered that the voter
prefers ci over ci+1 (ci+1 over ci respectively). The oracle initially sets θi = 1 and βi = n for every
odd integer i ∈ [m]. Suppose oracle receives a query to compare candidates ci and cj for i, j ∈ [m]
with i < j for a voter ℓ. If i is an even integer or j − i ⩾ 2 (that is, ci and cj belong to different
pairs), then the oracle answers that the voter ℓ prefers ci over cj . Otherwise we have j = i+ 1 and i
is an odd integer. The oracle answers the query to be ci ≻ ci+1 and updates θi to ℓ keeping βi fixed
if ∣ℓ − θi∣ ⩽ ∣ℓ − βi∣ and otherwise answers ci+1 ≻ ci and updates βi to ℓ keeping θi fixed (that is, the
oracle answers according to the vote which is closer to the voter ℓ between θi and βi and updates θi
or βi accordingly). If the pair (ci, ci+1) is queried less than (logn−2) times, then we have βi−θi ⩾ 2
at the end of the algorithm since every query for the pair (ci, ci+1) decreases βi − θi by at most a
factor of two and we started with βi−θi = n−1. Consider a voter κ with θi < κ < βi. If the elicitation
algorithm outputs that the voter κ prefers ci over ci+1 (respectively ci+1 over ci), then the oracle
sets all the voters κ′ with θi < κ′ < βi to prefer ci+1 over ci (respectively ci over ci+1). Clearly,
the algorithm does not elicit the preference of the voter κ correctly. Also, the profile is single
crossing with respect to the identity permutation of the voters and consistent with the answers of
all the queries made by the algorithm. Hence, for every odd integer i ∈ [m], the algorithm must
make at least (logn−1) queries for the pair (ci, ci+1) thereby making Ω(m logn) queries in total. ◻
We now present our Preference Elicitation algorithm when we have a sequential access
to the voters according to a single crossing order. We elicit the preference of the first voter using
Observation 2. From second vote onwards, we simply use the idea of insertion sort relative to
the previously elicited vote [Cor09]. Since we are using insertion sort, any particular voter may
be queried O(m2) times. However, we are able to bound the query complexity of our algorithm
due to two fundamental reasons: (i) consecutive preferences will often be almost similar in a single
crossing ordering, (ii) our algorithm takes only O(m) queries to elicit the preference of the current
voter if its preference is indeed the same as the preference of the voter preceding it. In other words,
every time we have to “pay” for shifting a candidate further back in the current vote, the relative
ordering of that candidate with all the candidates that it jumped over is now fixed, because for
these pairs, the one permitted crossing is now used up. We begin with presenting an important
subroutine called Elicit(⋅) which finds the preference of a voter ℓ given another preference R by
performing an insertion sort using R as the order of insertion.
Algorithm 1 Elicit(C , R , ℓ )
Input: A set of candidates C = {ci ∶ i ∈ [m]}, an ordering R = c1 ≻ ⋯ ≻ cm of C , a voter ℓ
Output: Preference ordering ≻ℓ of voter ℓ on C
1: Q← c1 ▷ Q will be the preference of the voter ℓ
2: for i← 2 to m do ▷ ci is inserted in the ith iteration
3: Scan Q linearly from index i−1 to 1 to find the index j where ci should be inserted according
to the preference of voter ℓ and insert ci in Q at j
4: end for
5: return Q
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For the sake of the analysis of our algorithm, let us to introduce a few terminologies. Given two
preferences ≻1 and ≻2, we call a pair of candidates (x, y) ∈ C × C, x ≠ y, good if both ≻1 and ≻2 order
them in a same way; a pair of candidates is called bad if it is not good. We divide the number of
queries made by our algorithm into two parts: goodCost(⋅) and badCost(⋅) which are the number of
queries made between good and respectively bad pair of candidates. In what follows, we show that
goodCost(⋅) for Elicit(⋅) is small and the total badCost(⋅) across all the runs of Elicit(⋅) is small.
Lemma 2 The goodCost(Elicit(C,R, ℓ)) of Elicit(C,R, ℓ) is O(m) (good is with respect to the pref-
erences R and ≻ℓ).
Proof: Follows immediately from the observation that in any iteration of the for loop at line 2 in
Algorithm 1, only one good pair of candidates are compared. ◻
We now use Algorithm 1 iteratively to find the profile. We present the pseudocode in Algo-
rithm 2 which works for the more general setting where a single crossing ordering is known but the
voters are arriving in any arbitrary order π. We next compute the query complexity of Algorithm 2
when voters are arriving in a single crossing order.
Algorithm 2 PreferenceElicit(π)
Input: π ∈ Sn
Output: Profile of all the voters
1: Q[π(1)] ← Elicit ≻π(1) using Observation 2 ▷ Q stores the profile
2: X ← {π(1)} ▷ Set of voters’ whose preferences have already been elicited
3: for i← 2 to n do ▷ Elicit the preference of voter π(i) in iteration i
4: k ←minj∈X ∣j − i∣ ▷ Find the closest known preference
5: R← Q[k],X ← X ∪ {π(i)}
6: Q[π(i)] ← Elicit(C,R, π(i))
7: end for
8: return Q
Theorem 2 Assume that the voters are arriving sequentially according to an order with respect to
which a profile P is single crossing. Then there is a Preference Elicitation algorithm with
query complexity O(mn +m2).
Proof: By renaming, let us assume, without loss of generality, that the voters are arriving according
to the identity permutation idn of the voters and the profile P is single crossing with respect to idn.
Let the profile P be (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) ∈ L(C)n. For two candidates x, y ∈ C and a voter i ∈ {2, . . . , n},
let us define a variable b(x, y, i) to be one if x and y are compared for the voter i by Elicit(C ,Pi−1,
i) and (x, y) is a bad pair of candidates with respect to the preferences of voter i and i−1; otherwise
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b(x, y, i) is defined to be zero. Then we have the following.
CostPreferenceElicit(idn) = O(m logm) + n∑
i=2
(goodCost(Query(C, Pi−1, i)) + badCost(Query(C, Pi−1, i)))
⩽ O(m logm +mn) + n∑
i=2
badCost(Query(C, Pi−1, i))
= O(m logm +mn) + ∑
(x,y)∈C×C
( n∑
i=2
b(x, y, i))
⩽ O(m logm +mn) + ∑
(x,y)∈C×C
1
= O(mn +m2)
The first inequality follows from Lemma 2, the second equality follows from the definition of
b(x, y, i), and the second inequality follows from the fact that ∑ni=2 b(x, y, i) ⩽ 1 for every pair of
candidates (x, y) ∈ C since the profile P is single crossing. ◻
We show next that, when the voters are arriving in a single crossing order, the query complexity
upper bound in Theorem 3 is tight for a large number of voters up to constant factors. The idea is to
pair up the candidates in a certain way and argue that the algorithm must compare the candidates
in every pair for every voter thereby proving a Ω(mn) lower bound on query complexity.
Theorem 3 Assume that the voters are arriving sequentially according to an order with respect
to which a profile P is single crossing. Then any Preference Elicitation algorithm has query
complexity Ω(m logm +mn).
Proof: The Ω(m logm) bound follows from the fact that any profile consisting of only one
preference P ∈ L(C) is single crossing. By renaming, let us assume without loss of generality that
the profile P is single crossing with respect to the identity permutation of the voters. Suppose we
have an even number of candidates and C = {c1, . . . , cm}. Consider the order Q = c1 ≻ c2 ≻ ⋯ ≻ cm
and the pairing of the candidates {c1, c2},{c3, c4}, . . . ,{cm−1, cm}. The oracle answers all the query
requests consistently according to the order Q till the first voter κ for which there exists at least
one odd integer i ∈ [m] such that the pair (ci, ci+1) is not queried. If there does not exist any such
κ, then the algorithm makes at least mn/2 queries thereby proving the statement. Otherwise, let κ
be the first vote such that the algorithm does not compare ci and ci+1 for some odd integer i ∈ [m].
The oracle answers the queries for the rest of the voters {κ + 1, . . . , n} according to the order
Q′ = c1 ≻ c2 ≻ ⋯ ≻ ci−1 ≻ ci+1 ≻ ci ≻ ci+2 ≻ ⋯ ≻ cm. If the algorithm orders ci ≻κ ci+1 in the preference
of the voter κ, then the oracle sets the preference of the voter κ to be Q′. On the other hand, if
the algorithm orders ci+1 ≻κ ci in the preference of voter κ, then the oracle sets the preference of
voter κ to be Q . Clearly, the elicitation algorithm fails to correctly elicit the preference of the
voter κ. However, the profiles for both the cases are single crossing with respect to the identity
permutation of the voters and are consistent with the answers given to all the queries made by the
algorithm. Hence, the algorithm must make at least mn/2 queries. ◻
We next move on to the case when we know a single crossing order of the voters; however, the
voters arrive in an arbitrary order π ∈ Sn. The idea is to call the function Elicit(C,R, i) where the
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current voter is the voter i and R is the preference of the voter which is closest to i according to a
single crossing ordering and whose preference has already been elicited by the algorithm.
Theorem 4 Assume that a profile P is known to be single crossing with respect to a known ordering
of voters σ ∈ Sn. However, the voters are arriving sequentially according to an arbitrary order π ∈ Sn
which may be different from σ. Then there is a Preference Elicitation algorithm with query
complexity O(mn +m2 logn).
Proof: By renaming, let us assume, without loss of generality, that the profile P is single peaked with
respect to the identity permutation of the voters. Let the profile P be (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) ∈ L(C)n.
Let f ∶ [n] Ð→ [n] be the function such that f(i) is the k corresponding to the i at line 4 in
Algorithm 2. For candidates x, y ∈ C and voter ℓ, we define b(x, y, ℓ) analogously as in the proof of
Theorem 2. We claim that B(x, y) = ∑ni=2 b(x, y, i) ⩽ logn. To see this, we consider any arbitrary
pair (x, y) ∈ C × C. Let the set of indices of the voters that have arrived immediately after the
first time (x, y) contributes to B(x, y) be {i1, i2, . . . , it}. Without loss of generality, let us assume
i1 < i2 < ⋯ < it. Again, without loss of generality, let us assume that voters i1, i2, . . . , ij prefer x over
y and voters ij+1, . . . , it prefer y over x. Let us define ∆ to be the difference between smallest index
of the voter who prefers y over x and the largest index of the voter who prefers x over y. Hence,
we currently have ∆ = ij+1− ij . A crucial observation is that if a new voter ℓ contributes to B(x, y)
then we must necessarily have ij < ℓ < ij+1. Another crucial observation is that whenever a new
voter contributes to B(x, y), the value of ∆ gets reduced at least by a factor of two by the choice
of k at line 4 in Algorithm 2. Hence, the pair (x, y) can contribute at most (1 + log∆) = O(logn)
to B(x, y) since we have ∆ ⩽ n to begin with. Then we have the following.
CostPreferenceElicit(π) = O(m logm) + n∑
i=2
goodCost(Query(C, Pf(i), i)) + badCost(Query(C, Pf(i), i))
⩽ O(m logm +mn) + n∑
i=2
badCost(Query(C, Pf(i), i))
= O(m logm +mn) + ∑
(x,y)∈C×C
n
∑
i=2
b(x, y, i)
⩽ O(m logm +mn) + ∑
(x,y)∈C×C
logn
= O(mn +m2 logn)
The first inequality follows from Lemma 2, the second equality follows from the definition of
b(x, y, i), and the second inequality follows from the fact that ∑ni=2 b(x, y, i) ⩽ logn. ◻
3.2 Results: Unknown Single Crossing Order
We now turn our attention to Preference Elicitation for single crossing profiles when no single
crossing ordering is known. Before we present our Preference Elicitation algorithm for this
setting, let us first prove a few structural results about single crossing profiles which we will use
crucially later. We begin with showing an upper bound on the number of distinct preferences in
any single crossing profile.
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Lemma 3 Let P be a profile on a set C of candidates which is single crossing. Then the number
of distinct preferences in P is at most (m
2
).
Proof: By renaming, let us assume, without loss of generality, that the profile P is single crossing
with respect to the identity permutation of the voters. We now observe that whenever the ith
vote is different from the (i + 1)th vote for some i ∈ [n − 1], there must exist a pair of candidates(x, y) ∈ C × C whom the ith vote and the (i + 1)th vote order differently. Now the statement follows
from the fact that, for every pair of candidates (a, b) ∈ C × C, there can exist at most one i ∈ [n − 1]
such that the ith vote and the (i + 1)th vote order a and b differently. ◻
We show next that in every single crossing profile P where all the preferences are distinct, there
exists a pair of candidates (x, y) ∈ C ×C such that nearly half of the voters in P prefer x over y and
the other voters prefer y over x.
Lemma 4 Let P be a profile of n voters such that all the preferences are distinct. Then there
exists a pair of candidates (x, y) ∈ C such that x is preferred over y in at least ⌊n/2⌋ preferences and
y is preferred over x in at least ⌊n/2⌋ preferences in P .
Proof: Without loss of generality, by renaming, let us assume that the profile P is single crossing
with respect to the identity permutation of the voters. Since all the preferences in P are distinct,
there exists a pair of candidates (x, y) ∈ C × C such that the voter ⌊n/2⌋ and the voter ⌊n/2⌋+ 1 order
x and y differently. Let us assume, without loss of generality, that the voter ⌊n/2⌋ prefers x over y.
Now, since the profile P is single crossing, every voter in [⌊n/2⌋] prefer x over y and every voter in{⌊n/2⌋ + 1, . . . , n} prefer y over x. ◻
Using Lemma 3 and 4 we now design a Preference Elicitation algorithm when no single
crossing ordering of the voters is known. The overview of the algorithm is as follows. At any point
of time in the elicitation process, we have the set Q of all the distinct preferences that we have
already elicited completely and we have to elicit the preference of a voter ℓ. We first search the set
of votes Q for a preference which is possibly same as the preference ≻ℓ of the voter ℓ. It turns out
that we can find a possible match ≻∈Q using O(log ∣Q∣) queries due to Lemma 4 which is O(logm)
due to Lemma 3. We then check whether the preference of the voter ℓ is indeed the same as ≻ or not
using O(m) queries. If ≻ is the same as ≻ℓ, then we have elicited ≻ℓ using O(m) queries. Otherwise,
we elicit ≻ℓ using O(m logm) queries using Observation 2. Fortunately, Lemma 3 tells us that we
would use the algorithm in Observation 2 at most O(m2) times. We present the pseudocode of
our Preference Elicitation algorithm in this setting in Algorithm 4. It uses Algorithm 3 as a
subroutine which returns true if the preference of any input voter is same as any given preference.
Theorem 5 Assume that a profile P is known to be single crossing. However, no ordering of the
voters with respect to which P is single crossing is known. The voters are arriving sequentially
according to an arbitrary order π ∈ Sn. Then there is a Preference Elicitation algorithm with
query complexity O(mn +m3 logm).
Proof: We present the pesudocode in Algorithm 4. We maintain two arrays in the algorithm. The
array R is of length n and the jth entry stores the preference of voter j. The other array Q stores
all the votes seen so far after removing duplicate votes; more specifically, if some specific preference
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Algorithm 3 Same(R , ℓ )
Input: R = c1 ≻ c2 ≻ ⋯ ≻ cm ∈ L(C), ℓ ∈ [n]
Output: true if the preference of the ℓth voter is R ; false otherwise
1: for i← 1 to m − 1 do
2: if Query(ci ≻ℓ ci+1) = false then
3: return false ▷ We have found a mismatch.
4: end if
5: end for
6: return true
≻ has been seen ℓ many times for any ℓ > 0, Q stores only one copy of ≻. Upon arrival of voter
i, we first check whether there is a preference in Q which is “potentially” same as the preference
of voter i. At the beginning of the search, our search space Q′ = Q for a potential match in Q
is of size ∣Q∣. We next iteratively keep halving the search space as follows. We find a pair of
candidates (x, y) ∈ C × C such that at least ⌊∣Q′∣/2⌋ preferences in Q′ prefer x over y and at least⌊∣Q′∣/2⌋ preferences prefer y over x. The existence of such a pair of candidates is guaranteed by
Lemma 4 and can be found in O(m2) time by simply going over all possible pairs of candidates.
By querying how voter i orders x and y, we reduce the search space Q′ for a potential match inQ to a set of size at most ⌊∣Q′∣/2⌋ + 1. Hence, in O(logm) queries, the search space reduces to only
one preference since we have ∣Q∣ ⩽ m2 by Lemma 3. Once we find a potential match w in Q (line
12 in Algorithm 4), we check whether the preference of voter i is the same as w or not using O(m)
queries. If the preference of voter i is indeed same as w, then we output w as the preference of
voter i. Otherwise, we use Observation 2 to elicit the preference of voter i using O(m logm) queries
and put the preference of voter i in Q . Since the number of times we need to use the algorithm
in Observation 2 is at most the number of distinct votes in P which is known to be at most m2 by
Lemma 3, we get the statement. ◻
Theorem 5 immediately gives us the following corollary in the random access to voters model when
no single crossing ordering is known.
Corollary 1 Assume that a profile P is known to be single crossing. However, no ordering of the
voters with respect to which P is single crossing is known. Given a random access to voters, there
is an Preference Elicitation algorithm with query complexity O(mn +m3 logm).
Proof: Algorithm 4 works for this setting also and exact same bound on the query complexity
holds. ◻
We now show that the query complexity upper bound of Corollary 1 is tight up to constant factors
for large number of voters.
Theorem 6 Given a random access to voters, any Preference Elicitation algorithm which
do not know any ordering of the voters with respect to which the input profile is single crossing has
query complexity Ω(m logm +mn).
Proof: The Ω(m logm) bound follows from sorting lower bound and the fact that any profile
consisting of only one preference P ∈ L(C) is single crossing. Suppose we have an even number
of candidates and C = {c1, . . . , cm}. Consider the ordering Q = c1 ≻ c2 ≻ ⋯ ≻ cm and the pairing
of the candidates {c1, c2},{c3, c4}, . . . ,{cm−1, cm}. The oracle answers all the query requests
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Algorithm 4 PreferenceElicitUnknownSingleCrossingOrdering(π)
Input: π ∈ Sn
Output: Profile of all the voters
1: R,Q ← ∅ ▷ Q stores all the votes seen so far without duplicate. R stores the profile.
2: for i← 1 to n do ▷ Elicit preference of the ith voter in ith iteration of this for loop.
3: Q′ ←Q
4: while ∣Q′∣ > 1 do ▷ Search Q to find a vote potentially same as the preference of π(i)
5: Let x, y ∈ C be two candidates such that at least ⌊∣Q′∣/2⌋ votes in Q′ prefer x over y and
at least ⌊∣Q′∣/2⌋ votes in Q′ prefer y over x.
6: if Query(x ≻π(i) y) = true then
7: Q′ ← {v ∈ Q′ ∶ v prefers x over y}
8: else
9: Q′ ← {v ∈ Q′ ∶ v prefers y oer x}
10: end if
11: end while
12: Let w be the only vote in Q′ ▷ w is potentially same as the preference of π(i)
13: if Same(w,π(i)) = true then ▷ Check whether the vote π(i) is potentially same as w
14: R[π(i)] ← w
15: else
16: R[π(i)] ← Elicit using Observation 2
17: Q ←Q ∪ {R[π(i)]}
18: end if
19: end for
20: return R
consistently according to the ordering Q. We claim that any Preference Elicitation algorithmA must compare ci and ci+1 for every voter and for every odd integer i ∈ [m]. Indeed, otherwise,
there exist a voter κ and an odd integer i ∈ [m] such that the algorithm A does not compare
ci and ci+1. Suppose the algorithm outputs a profile P ′. If the voter κ prefers ci over ci+1 inP ′, then the oracle fixes the preference ≻κ to be c1 ≻ c2 ≻ ⋯ ≻ ci−1 ≻ ci+1 ≻ ci ≻ ci+2 ≻ ⋯ ≻ cm;
otherwise the oracle fixes ≻κ to be Q . The algorithm fails to correctly output the preference of
the voter κ in both the cases. Also the final profile with the oracle is single crossing with respect
to any ordering of the voters that places the voter κ at the end. Hence, A must compare ci
and ci+1 for every voter and for every odd integer i ∈ [m] and thus has query complexity Ω(mn). ◻
3.3 Nearly Single Crossing
We now consider preference elicitation for profiles which are nearly single crossing. We begin with
profiles with bounded single crossing width.
Proposition 1 Suppose a profile P is single crossing with width w. Given a Preference Elic-
itation algorithm A with query complexity q(m,n) for random or sequential access to the vot-
ers when a single crossing order is known or unknown, there exists another Preference Elic-
itation algorithm A′ for the single crossing profiles with width w which has query complexityO(q(m/w, n) +mn logw) under same setting as A .
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Proof: Let the partition of the set of candidates C with respect to which the profile P is single
crossing be Ci, i ∈ [⌈m/w⌉]. Hence, C = ∪i∈[⌈m/w⌉]Ci and Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ for every i, j ∈ [⌈m/w⌉] with i ≠ j.
Let C′ be a subset of candidates containing exactly one candidate from Ci for each i ∈ [⌈m/w⌉].
We first find P(C′) using A . The query complexity of this step is O(q(m/w, n)). Next we findP(Ci) using Observation 2 for every i ∈ [m/w] thereby finding P . The overall query complexity isO(q(m/w, n) + (m/w)nw logw) = O(q(m/w, n) +mn logw). ◻
4 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented Preference Elicitation algorithms with low query complexity
for single crossing profiles under various settings. Moreover, we have proved that the query com-
plexity of our algorithms are tight for large number of voters up to constant factors for all but one
setting namely when the voters can be accessed randomly but we do not know any ordering with
respect to which the voters are single crossing. An immediate future work is to have a matching
query complexity bound for the only open case. We do not assume any prior knowledge about the
profile. It would be interesting to study the effect of prior knowledge on the query complexity for
preference elicitation.
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